Rethinking Democratization in Post-9/11 Afghanistan: State-Building Before Democracy?

Moheb Jabarkhail

Democracy faced numerous challenges in Afghanistan after the West returned to the country following the tragic 9/11 events.  For more than two decades, from 2001 to 2021, Afghan politicians and the West pursued an ambitious project to promote and stabilize Afghanistan into a modern democratic state.  The end goal was to transform the country's political landscape through elections, constitutional governance, and institution-building, the pillars of modern democracy. However, despite significant investments of blood and treasure from both Afghans and the Western supporters, the project ultimately collapsed in August 2021 when the Islamic Republic fell, and the Taliban, an insurgent opposition group, returned to authoritarian government. Five years later, a difficult but necessary question remains: Was the failure simply the result of poor implementation of democracy, or did it reflect a deeper mismatch between Afghanistan's political realities and the democratic model that was promoted?

The question is particularly relevant given the West's long-standing relationships with non-democratic governments throughout the Middle East. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and others have maintained close political, economic, and security partnerships with Western powers despite lacking liberal democratic systems. In these cases, stability and strategic interests often outweighed concerns about political representation. Why, then, was Afghanistan viewed differently?

This is not an argument against democracy. Rather, it is an argument for reexamining the sequence through which democracy develops. Afghanistan's experience suggests that democratic ideals and institutions cannot be successfully imposed in the absence of strong state institutions, national political cohesion, and a functioning political culture.

Historically, Afghanistan's most stable period in the modern era occurred under King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who ruled from 1933 to 1973. During this period, Afghanistan experienced relative political stability, gradual modernization, and limited constitutional reforms, particularly following the adoption of the 1964 Constitution (Barfield, 2010; Dupree, 1980). While Afghanistan was not a democracy by contemporary standards, the country experienced relative political stability, gradual modernization, and increasing engagement with the international community. Afghan reformers such as Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, Mohammad Musa Shafiq, and the King himself promoted the 1964 Constitution, which introduced elements of constitutional governance and political participation while maintaining strong central authority. Although imperfect, this model reflected an indigenous and gradual approach to political reform rather than a rapid transition to mass liberal democracy. 

The decades that followed the monarchy's collapse were marked by coups, foreign intervention, civil war, and state fragmentation. When democracy was reintroduced after 2001, Afghanistan faced enormous structural challenges, including weak state institutions, the absence of strong national political parties, limited bureaucratic capacity, and a weak national identity marked by persistent ethnic and factional divisions (Rubin, 2002; Maley, 2021). Political competition often followed ethnic, linguistic, regional, and factional lines rather than ideological or policy-based divisions. Elections became mechanisms for contesting power but did not necessarily create legitimacy, stability, or effective governance.

The international community frequently measured success through electoral milestones, yet elections alone could not compensate for weak institutions. Perception of corruption became widespread, public trust eroded, and many Afghans viewed political processes and politicians as disconnected from their daily realities. The resulting system struggled to establish the legitimacy necessary for long-term stability.  Successive electoral crises, particularly in 2009, 2014, and 2019, exposed weaknesses in political institutions and undermined public confidence in democratic governance (SIGAR, 2019; International Crisis Group, 2021).

Political scientists have long argued that institutions must often precede democracy. Samuel Huntington famously warned that rapid political mobilization without corresponding institutional development can generate instability and political decay (Huntington, 1968). More recently, Francis Fukuyama has emphasized that effective state institutions, the rule of law, and accountable governance are prerequisites for sustainable democratic systems (Fukuyama, 2014). Afghanistan's experience appears to support these arguments. The challenge was not that democracy is inherently incompatible with Afghan society, but that democratic competition was introduced before the necessary institutional foundations were firmly established.  

Comparative experiences from South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and post-Franco Spain suggest that democratization is often most successful when preceded by substantial state-building and institutional development. In each case, political liberalization emerged gradually alongside growing state capacity, economic transformation, and the development of governing institutions (Huntington, 1991; Fukuyama, 2014). South Korea and Taiwan, for example, experienced extended periods of authoritarian rule before transitioning to competitive democratic systems in the late twentieth century, while Spain's democratic transition followed decades of centralized governance under Francisco Franco (Diamond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Although Afghanistan's circumstances differ significantly from these examples, they challenge the assumption that elections alone can create democratic governance. Rather, they suggest that the sequencing of political development may be as important as the democratic institutions themselves. Afghanistan's experience may therefore be better understood as a lesson in premature democratization than as a rejection of democracy altogether. 

Critics contend that Afghanistan's democratic experiment failed not because democracy itself was unsuitable, but because international actors empowered ethnicized warlords, tolerated corruption, and prioritized short-term stability over institution-building. Scholars such as Barnett Rubin and Thomas Ruttig have argued that implementation flaws and a lack of institutionalized approach to governance significantly contributed to the collapse of the post-2001 political order (Rubin, 2002; Ruttig, 2021).  Others argue that Afghanistan's democratic project was undermined not by excessive democratization but by insufficient commitment to democratic principles. Power-sharing arrangements, patronage networks, election manipulation, and dependence on international funding weakened public trust and prevented institutions from maturing. 

This raises an uncomfortable question for both Afghans and the international community: Should the ultimate goal in Afghanistan be democracy now, or should it be the creation of a stable and effective state capable of eventually supporting organic democratic governance in Afghanistan?

For many Western policymakers, engagement with Afghanistan's current political authorities remains politically difficult. Yet international relations have never been governed solely by ideological preferences. Throughout history, states and the West have engaged governments with vastly different political systems when doing so served broader interests such as stability, security, and economic cooperation. The issue, therefore, may not be whether Afghanistan's current system conforms to Western democratic standards, but whether it can provide security, basic services, economic opportunity, and a framework for gradual political inclusion and evolution. 

None of this suggests that Afghanistan should permanently abandon democratic aspirations. Democracy remains the most legitimate and sustainable means of ensuring accountability, political participation, and peaceful transfers of power in any country. However, Afghanistan's recent history demonstrates that democracy cannot simply be transplanted into a society emerging from decades of conflict and fragmentation. Political development is often evolutionary rather than revolutionary.  The lesson from Afghanistan may therefore be one of sequencing rather than ideology. Strong institutions, national cohesion, economic development, and effective governance may need to come before competitive democratic politics can succeed. Just as Afghanistan's monarchy pursued gradual political reform during the 1960s, the country's future political evolution may require an internally driven process rather than one designed or accelerated from abroad.

Afghanistan's future may ultimately depend less on choosing between democracy and non-democracy than on determining the sequence through which political legitimacy, state capacity, and citizen participation are built. The lesson of the past two decades may not be that democracy failed in Afghanistan, but that democracy was asked to do too much before the foundations necessary to sustain it had fully emerged.

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Moheb Jabarkhail is the Founder of The Afghanistan Affairs, an independent platform focused on research and policy analysis on Afghanistan’s economy, governance, and development. He is a policy researcher and international development professional with experience in economic development, trade, private sector development, and regional integration, including work with international organizations and donor-funded programs. 

References

Barfield, T. (2010). Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton University Press.

Carothers, T. (2002). "The End of the Transition Paradigm." Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5–21. 

Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dupree, L. (1980). Afghanistan. Princeton University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2014). Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press.

International Crisis Group. (2021). Afghanistan: Getting Negotiations Back on Track. Brussels.

Jabarkhail, M. (2021). Afghanistan's Future Under the Taliban Regime: Engagement or Isolation?

Jabarkhail, M. (2025). Regional Integration of Afghanistan Under Taliban 2.0.

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press.Maley, W. (2021). The Afghanistan Wars. Red Globe Press.

Rubin, B. R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Yale University Press.

Ruttig, T. (2021). Afghanistan's Collapse: Why the Political System Failed. Afghanistan Analysts Network.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). (2019). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Arlington, Virginia.

 

A Review of the Latest World Bank's Afghanistan Development Update (ADU)

Moheb Jabarkhail

June 10, 2026

The World Bank's latest development update on Afghanistan presents a striking paradox.  On the one hand, macroeconomic indicators point to resilience and modest recovery. On the other hand, poverty continues to deepen, and many Afghans are becoming poorer despite headline economic growth.

According to the report, Afghanistan's real GDP grew by approximately 4.8% in FY2025. Growth was driven primarily by services and industry, alongside stronger domestic revenue mobilization. Tax revenues reached nearly 20% of GDP, reflecting stronger domestic revenue mobilization and improved tax collection.

At first glance, these figures suggest an economy on a path toward stabilization. Yet the broader reality is more complex. Macroeconomic growth has not translated into meaningful improvements in living standards for most Afghans.

By the end of 2025, Afghanistan's population was estimated at 47.4 million, while GDP per capita stood at only $353. Since 2023, nearly five million Afghan refugees and migrants have returned from neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran. This rapid population increase has significantly outpaced economic growth, contributing to a 5.6% decline in GDP per capita and placing additional pressure on labor markets, housing, public services, and food systems.

At the same time, regional trade disruptions, poor agricultural harvests, and rising fuel costs linked to broader geopolitical tensions have pushed inflation above 7%, further eroding household purchasing power.

The World Bank's Afghanistan Development Update underscores a fundamental reality: while macroeconomic stability has improved, economic recovery remains insufficient to keep pace with the country's rapidly growing population and rising development needs.

Moving forward, Afghanistan's long-term economic prospects will depend less on short-term humanitarian assistance and more on its ability to attract private investment, strengthen market institutions, expand regional trade, and create productive employment opportunities. Achieving these objectives will require a coordinated approach that combines humanitarian support with targeted development interventions aimed at revitalizing the private sector and improving economic competitiveness.

The central question is whether Afghan institutions, development partners, and the private sector can work together to transform the country's demonstrated resilience into inclusive, sustainable, and broad-based economic growth that improves livelihoods for millions of Afghans.

In my view, the most significant finding of the report is not the 4.8% GDP growth rate, but the decline in GDP per capita. This highlights the growing gap between macroeconomic stability and household welfare. Unless economic growth accelerates beyond population growth, poverty reduction will remain elusive regardless of improvements in fiscal performance.

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Moheb Jabarkhail is the Founder of The Afghanistan Affairs, an independent platform dedicated to research and analysis on Afghanistan's economy and development. He is a policy researcher and international development professional with extensive experience in economic development, trade, private sector development, and regional integration. His work has supported governments, international organizations, and development partners in advancing sustainable economic growth and development outcomes in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Fairy Tale of Two Upset Neighbors

Moheb Jabarkhail

Afghanistan and Pakistan, being immediate neighbors, share more than just a border. People on both sides share cultural similarities (Pashtunwali), language (Pashto), sports (cricket), food, and history. Very few neighbors on the planet can claim to share so much, yet, terror attacks constantly push both the nations away and undo years of formal and informal diplomatic efforts made towards confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Pakistan has remained home to millions of Afghan refugees escaping the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Even today, nearly 2 million documented and undocumented Afghans live in Pakistan, run their businesses, send their children to schools and universities, are married in Pakistani families, and, therefore, consider their host country home.

However, after the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, the two countries have remained at odds in building mutually beneficial and trusted relations. Moreover, on the people-to-people level, in some sections, there still remains animosity and hatred towards each other. This can widely be noticed when, soon after a terror attack in either country, the social media “trolls” start propagating fake news and hate-filled content, calling out citizens of the other country. Where Pakistanis use various derogatory slurs for Afghan refugees, calling them terrorists and accusing them of “having a soft spot for Pakistan’s arch-nemesis India”, Afghans, on the other hand, pin nearly all terror attacks in their country on Pakistan; especially on the intelligence agencies and the military establishment.

Political leaders and the people of Afghanistan feel that they have failed to seek sufficient conviction from Pakistan to prove themselves as a reliable regional partner. They also feel that Islamabad has provided little incentive or support to the civilian Afghan governments in building credibility and overcoming security hurdles. In addition to that, there remains a widespread perception in Afghanistan that Islamabad did not take the Kabul government’s side in the US-Taliban peace talks.

Pakistan, on the other hand, feels that all governments in Kabul since 2001 have sought to scapegoat Islamabad for all security mishaps and attacks in Afghanistan. Moreover, after conducting dozens of major and minor military operations in the erstwhile FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) region, Pakistan also believes that it has “contained” much of the militant and terrorist activity on the border. Hence, in order to consolidate the gains from these operations, Pakistan has made substantial progress in fencing the Afghan border. However, Afghanistan’s reservations on the fencing and continued reluctance to accept a globally recognized border (The Durand Line), according to Islamabad, hints at the non-seriousness of governments in Kabul to discuss mutual security and development concerns. Therefore, the mistrust between both the neighbors has also resulted in a vicious cycle of blame game on both sides.

In terms of its security landscape, Afghanistan has continued facing lingering violence and conflict over the past 20 years. Both post-Taliban administrations in Afghanistan, the Hamid Karzai government (2001-2014) and the Ashraf Ghani government (2014-present), have remained unsuccessful in effectively tackling the fundamental challenge of insecurity in Afghanistan. Their inability in bringing peace to the country is also partly due to their failure in building a viable regional consensus; especially with Pakistan. Unilateral approaches and lack of cooperation have resulted in the pursuit of alienated and divergent foreign policy objectives in Kabul.

Afghans experience detriments of violence in towns and villages on a daily basis. The recent brutal siege of a maternity ward at a hospital in Kabul, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic and in the holy month of Ramadan, is a stark reminder that all Afghans, including children and women, are vulnerable targets to terror and violence. The country cannot resolve its security dilemmas on its own. It does and will require a brotherly hand from Pakistan to overcome this crisis effectively.

Pakistan, in recent years, has been largely successful in curtailing terrorism on its home soil. This means that Islamabad now has the military “know-how” to disrupt and contain terrorist groups. By lending these insights and knowledge to the Afghan security institutions, Islamabad can play an instrumental role in facilitating a peaceful resolution to ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan. Moreover, Afghanistan, for its part, should listen to Pakistan’s legitimate concerns and play its needed role towards contributing to regional peace and stability.

However, Islamabad also needs to shed its notorious “pro-Taliban regime” perception that it has gained among wider sections of the Afghan population. Afghans argue that if Pakistan is serious in establishing peace in the region, it should also support the cause of a “stable, free and democratic” Afghanistan. In this regard, many Afghans commonly ask,

“If Pakistan cannot accept a militant regime in its own backyard, and has fought against militant groups, why does it wish the same for us (in form of a Taliban regime)?”

The people of Afghanistan have suffered violence for far too long and perhaps no one understands how this feels better than the Pakistanis living next door. It is time for both the neighbors to jointly work towards breaking the siege of terror that has inflicted suffering on innocent people and continues to claim precious lives.

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This article was also published by the Express Tribune in Pakistan in May 2020.

Peace in Afghanistan: The Unanswered Question of Governance

Moheb Jabarkhail

As negotiations between the United States and the Taliban moved closer to a peace agreement in 2019, optimism grew that Afghanistan's nearly two-decade-long conflict might finally be approaching an end. Following the eighth round of talks in Doha, Qatar, both sides expressed positive views about the progress made, fueling speculation that a historic agreement was within reach.

Yet beneath the optimism surrounding the negotiations lay a fundamental question with profound implications for Afghanistan's future: What kind of governance system would emerge after a peace deal?

While much attention focused on troop withdrawals, counterterrorism commitments, and ceasefire arrangements, comparatively little attention was paid to the political framework that would govern Afghanistan once a settlement was reached. For many Afghans, this issue was arguably the most consequential aspect of any peace agreement.

The United States entered Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, seeking to dismantle Al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime that had provided it sanctuary. At the time, Afghanistan was governed under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a system in which Mullah Mohammad Omar served as the Amir-ul-Mumineen (Commander of the Faithful) following his selection by a council of religious leaders. Although Kabul was the country's capital, political authority was largely exercised from Kandahar, the Taliban's traditional power base.

The collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 paved the way for a new political order. Through the Bonn Agreement and subsequent international efforts, Afghanistan began building democratic institutions based on constitutional governance. The country's new constitution, adopted in 2004 following a Constitutional Loya Jirga, established a highly centralized presidential system with elected leadership and defined terms of office.

Under this framework, President Hamid Karzai served as Afghanistan's transitional leader and subsequently completed two elected presidential terms. In 2014, power was transferred to President Ashraf Ghani following a disputed election that resulted in the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG), a political arrangement brokered with international support. The agreement introduced the position of Chief Executive Officer, creating a power-sharing structure outside the formal constitutional framework.

As peace negotiations advanced in 2019, the central debate increasingly focused on the future of Afghanistan's political system. Would the country continue under its constitutional presidential framework, or would a new arrangement emerge that incorporated elements of the Taliban's preferred Emirate model?

The distinction was significant.

Under Afghanistan's constitution, political legitimacy is derived from elections and the rule of law. Presidents were elected for fixed terms, and government authority was defined by constitutional provisions. In contrast, the Emirate model did not rely on electoral processes. Political authority would instead be vested in an Amir selected through consultation among religious and political elites, serving without the electoral mechanisms embedded in the post-2001 constitutional order.

These competing visions reflected broader disagreements about the future of the Afghan state.

President Ashraf Ghani consistently emphasized that elections and constitutional continuity were essential components of any peace process. In his Eid-ul-Adha address in August 2019, he reaffirmed that elections remained a national priority and that peace should be pursued within the framework of the constitution.

The Taliban, however, viewed the situation differently. Their priority was securing an agreement with the United States, while questions regarding Afghanistan's future political arrangements would be addressed later through negotiations with Afghan political actors. The movement also continued to reject direct negotiations with the Afghan government, arguing that it lacked legitimacy.

These opposing perspectives raised critical questions that remained unanswered.

How would Afghanistan be governed following a peace agreement? Would elections proceed as planned? How would the Taliban be integrated into national political institutions? Would the Constitution remain intact, be amended, or be replaced entirely?

The answers to these questions would ultimately determine not only the durability of any peace settlement but also the future character of the Afghan state.

For both Afghanistan and the international community, the challenge extended beyond ending armed conflict. Sustainable peace required political legitimacy, institutional stability, and a governance framework capable of commanding broad public support. Any settlement that failed to address these issues risked replacing one form of instability with another.

As negotiations continued, the future of Afghanistan depended not only on reaching a peace agreement but on defining the political order that would follow. The long-term viability of any settlement would rest on whether Afghans could reconcile competing visions of governance while preserving the legitimacy necessary for lasting peace and stability.

Afghanistan’s New Ambassador to Pakistan: Opportunity for Establishing Better Af-Pak Relations?

The National Unity Government of Afghanistan recently appointed a new ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The choice of President Ghani for this appointment is Dr. Hazrat-Omar Zakhilwal, Ex. Chief Economist and Ex. Minister of Finance.  In addition to being the Afghan Ambassador, Dr. Zakhilwal is titled to be the Afghan President’s special envoy in Pakistan.

Dr. Zakhilwal appointment for this important position says it outright that the new Afghan government values better economic and political ties with Pakistan.  To achieve this ambitious goal, Dr. Zakhilwal is better placed than any other Afghan politician.

Unlike other politicians in the previous Afghan administration, Zakhilwal has already established work-able relation with his Pakistani counterparts especially when he served as the Minister of Finance under Ex. President Karzai.  An example of the cooperation between the two countries has been Dr Zakhilwal's success in attracting cooperating response from Mr. Ishaq Dar, the Pakistani Minister for Treasury, to improve bilateral economic ties.  He succeeded in mobilizing the Pakistani government’s much needed political support for the important Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) 1300 Mega Watt electricity transmission project.  Under CASA, Afghanistan will receive a transit fee for the large amount of electricity transmitted to Pakistan for a transit fee.  This is a significant project that can promote regional integration and prosperity. 

Afghanistan’s President Ghani envisions precisely this sort of economic ties with Pakistan.  He believes that if the two countries are genuine in their relations, each can contribute significantly to the other’s economic development.  President Ghani would like to see a 100+ more CASAs between Afghanistan and Pakistan.  And for that to happen, Kabul needs a representative in Islamabad that can help create similar interest and thinking in Pakistan.  Dr. Zakhilwal, for his experience, is a good fit for this purpose.

Afghan Interest in Promoting Political Ties

President Ghani’s administration has also been trying to establish friendlier political relations with Pakistan.  Ever since coming to power in 2014, President Ghani sought support from Saudi Arabia and China, Pakistan’s geo-political allies and traveled directly to Pakistan to gather momentum for renewed trust and ties with Pakistan particularly in quelling the insurgency in Afghanistan. 

For a while the new efforts seemed working and hopes for better ties between the two countries were high.  However, due to the exposure of the surprising death of Mulla Omar, the Taliban Supreme Leader, and subsequent violence in Kabul, bilateral relations went sore and back to square one.  Since then, optimism for a different chapter in Af-Pak relations has seemed as distant as it did during the previous Afghan administration.  this is not in the interest of any of the two neighbors. 

Afghanistan has always expected Pakistan to value its relations with the democratically elected government in Kabul than other non-state groups, and to cooperatively support the war torn country’s reconstruction and development efforts.  Kabul feels this has not happened for a long time and despite numerous exhausting efforts from Kabul.

However, Dr. Zakhilwal’s appointment may be a turning point and an opportunity for generating a different response from Pakistan.  He has proven to already possess the required leadership, understanding of the context, and previous success in building trust with Pakistan.

Considering that years of instability, mistrust and violence in the Af-Pak region has had devastating geo-political and economic consequences for both the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the two countries should seize this renewed opportunity and utilize on it to establish the momentum for a more peaceful, integrated and successful Af-Pak region.  That in turn will contribute to prosperity and security in Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond.

Will this happen, however, remains a big question to be answered in Islamabad.

Dealing with Poverty is Another Priority for the New Govt. in Kabul

With President Ashraf Ghani’s government finally taking hold in Kabul, it also needs to focus on dealing with Afghanistan real socioeconomic problem: poverty.

Poverty has been a serious issue in Afghan society; a larger number of Afghans live either in poverty or are at risk of falling into poverty if there was a crisis. This is the case despite Afghanistan having ample natural resources. According to the World Bank, poverty rate in Afghanistan is at staggering 38 percent. This figure has remained unchanged since 2008 despite a large sum of development aid injected to its economy.

The crippling poverty has vicious impact on Afghanistan. It has been a leading contributor to violence, political instability and radicalization especially in the rural parts of the country where majority of the Afghan people live. In the rural areas, the Afghans especially the youth live in dismal poverty having minimum access to inadequate education or employment opportunities. Such circumstances flourish ripe conditions for poverty to prosper causing further grievances in Afghan society.

Poverty has ruled Afghan society for too long now and it continues to cause troubles due to the nonexistence of a strong political will both in the previous Afghan leadership and within the international development partners active in Afghanistan, non existences of a cohesive human development plan and an effective strategy to fight poverty or focus on effective and inclusive economic development.

Now that President Ashraf Ghani is in charge and has a wealth of both experience and education in poverty eradication and human development programs, his government should prioritize eradicating poverty and related serious underdevelopment problem in Afghanistan.

This is no easy task but it is possible if there is a sincere political will to eliminate corruption, boost human capital and capacity, attract investment, use international development aid more effectively, better utilize Afghanistan's natural resources, foster trade and create a conducive environment for the private sector development. All of these efforts can contribute to better public and private sectors that can provide jobs and in turn alleviate poverty in Afghanistan.

President Ghani’s unity government should have and implement that political will and enable Afghans to break from the vicious cycle of poverty & violence and instead live in prosperity. If President Ghani can do this, he would be remembered as the savior for a country that has been stuck in vicious poverty for too long now.

Time is Ripe for a New Chapter in Af-Pak Relations

Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s new president has provided hope for peace and stability to the troubled nation.

Even in his first weeks in office, President Ghani, a former World Bank technocrat and professor in leading American Universities, has embarked on sweeping reforms from tackling corruption to resolving the issues of the prisoners in Kabul’s Puli Charkhi prison. Ghani seems serious and an ideal leader for a post-conflict country such as Afghanistan where people want swift actions from public leaders and are usually frustrated by lack of action.

President Ghani has yet to nominate his cabinet and governors of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The general perception in Afghanistan is that together with his Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, he will nominate one soon, and it could be a more technocratic one than compared to his predecessor, Hamid Karzai. Ghani’s minister selection will be important for delivering on his campaign promises and furthering the tasks he has started in Afghanistan.

Among the many policy issues facing Ghani, a major one is how he tackles Afghanistan’s troubled relations with its eastern neighbor, Pakistan.

Afghanistan and Pakistan share a long border of nearly 2,600 kilometres (1,615 miles) named as the “Durand Line.” Pakistan recognizes this line as an “international border” crossing inherited from British India; Afghanistan, however, recognizes it only as a temporary boundary that was agreed to between British India and the Afghan Emir more than a century ago. Borer disputes have resulted in serious mistrust between Kabul and Islamabad, and both sides have failed to capitalize on the enormous economic benefits they can reap from establishing cordial relations.

Hamid Karzai, the outgoing Afghan president, labeled Pakistan as one of the key stakeholders to peace and stability in Afghanistan. However, he also outlined that his nearly 20 state visits to Pakistan and many efforts failed to result in any constructive outcome.

Now that there is new leadership in Kabul and that Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is keen on contributing to a more stable region, it might be the right time for both sides to turn pages and open a new chapter in Af-Pak relations.

Unlike the past, President Ghani should take lead and propose a more compromising approach that builds trust and enables Pakistan to see more benefits in Afghan stability. One thing that President Ghani should make sure to avoid is to break from the past where most of Afghanistan’s problems are blamed on Pakistan.

Instead, President Ghani’s government should opt for a policy that recognizes the need for mutual Af-Pak relations, defies issues of mistrust and promises good will for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This policy should also focus on promoting regional economic cooperation that in turn can foster mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Pakistan’s leadership should also respect Afghan’s desire for stability and actively engage with Kabul on overcoming political and security challenges. Unlike the past, Pakistan’s strategic depth policy should seek closer economic ties with Afghanistan and understand that building better and more trustful relations with Afghanistan’s legitimate government in Kabul is better for Pakistan’s future stability.

If both Afghan and Pakistani leaders can make this shift in their foreign policies, the two Asian countries can benefit from significant economic and political relations, and collectively contribute to more prosperous societies in the region.

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This article is also published at SGV at http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/af-pak-relations-401/

Afghans Successfully Conduct Run-Off Presidential Elections

Afghans once again proved they want peace and democracy to prevail in their homeland.

On June 14, nearly 7 million Afghans, 31 percent of them women, turned out to vote in the historic run-off Presidential elections in Afghanistan.

This is the first time Afghanistan is preparing for an elected president to transfer power to another candidate through the ballot box.

The fact that this election has attracted so much interest in Afghanistan and received a big voter turnout proves Afghans have come a long way in leading their nation and in defying those not wanting the democratic process to succeed.

The Election Campaigns

Afghans were left to choose from two candidates: Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani, when the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan announced in May 2014 that none of the candidates had secured 50%+1 of the total votes.

In the official election campaigns, candidates reached out to their constituencies across Afghanistan to secure votes. The candidates promised many to do(s) from restructuring the political system to establishing new provinces in the country, from building the economy and roads to improving human rights.

Media outlets were also busy. Some worked directly for broadcasting political campaigns for one of the candidates; others benefited from lucrative and colorful advertisements. However, most of the media outlets were disappointed when one of the candidates intentionally turned downed requests for a public debate with the other candidate.

The Election Day

The election-day in Afghanistan was a festive one. Despite security threats, Afghans came out in large numbers to vote. Men and women, young and the old wanted to vote and be part of the history in making in Afghanistan.

In some provinces, music accompanied the election process. Further live coverage from Afghanistan’s vibrant media outlets, the TVs in particular, made it possible for Afghans to watch the process in the comfort of their homes and be independent observers on the ballot boxes.

In the midst of all these efforts, Afghan security forces were the real heroes. They were the ones that made Afghans proud by making the day a relatively peaceful one across the country. Minor security incidents were reported but none threatened the election process. The security forces proved they are capable of keeping order in tact and they can be counted on as national heroes of this war-torn country.

Results of the Elections

Afghanistan election law requires all complaints to be attended to before partial and final results are announced. The Independent Election Commission for Complaints collects all grievances from the candidate’s group, reviews them and in light of them approves or disapprove the results of a polling station.

After all complains are addressed, the results are sent to the Independent Election Commission for announcement. The initial results of today’s elections are due on July 2 while the final results are due sometime later in July.

Afghans eagerly look forward to hearing these results and ask on both candidates to accept the results. They expect both Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ghani to be responsible Afghan leaders that will respect the decision of the Afghan people and continue to play a stabilizing role in Afghanistan; otherwise, they risk national disapproval.

Work Waiting the New President

After President Obama has announced for the US military draw down and eventual reduction of forces to only a few hundred by end of 2016 in Afghanistan, a major job waiting a new Afghan president is to prepare for this transition.

Afghan forces still need support to be prepared in dealing with the insurgency and security threats here. A new president would also need to keep international support mainly from the US through the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to maintain the necessary resources for this transition to be successful.

Other than the security transition, another challenge facing the new Afghan leadership is putting an end to the Taliban insurgency in the country. Afghans understand that in order for the country to maintain its achievements of the last decade, it needs viable and sustainable peace. This isn’t possible without reaching a truce with all insurgent groups including the Taliban. A new president would need to have a new approach to making this happen.

Beyond the challenges in political scenario, Afghanistan also needs to further its economic development agenda. The country still grapples with poverty, lack of investment and jobs for the youth in particular. Also, Afghanistan is faced with a declining international aid environment.

Therefore, a new leader would need to have the necessary skills and political will to better manage its internal resources. This includes ending the perception of corruption and exploring alternative resources such as trade facilitation, revenue mobilization and natural resource management to boost economic growth and development.

The Way Forward for Afghanistan

Today, Afghans once again proved they want peace and democracy to prevail in their homeland. They are not afraid to go out and vote despite numerous challenges; on the contrary, Afghans are ever resilient and committed to bringing a change and lead Afghanistan’s march towards a mature and stable democracy.

However, in order for this resilient country to build on its recent achievements and avoid relapse to a weak state vulnerable to conflicts and interventions, Afghanistan still needs strong international support mainly from Washington. Many Afghans hope this will continue well beyond 2014.

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This article was also published on Sharnoff Global Views at http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/afghans-presidential-elections-331/

يوه څوکی او ۱۱ کاندیدان

يوه څوکی او ۱۱ کاندیدان

محب ارسلان

د اپریل په ۵ نیټه میلیونونه افغانان د ګواخونو ، ستونزو ، سړی او بارانی هوا سره سره د رایو ورکولو محلونو ته ورغلل او خپله رایه یی وکاروله.  دی کار دنیاوال هیران کړل، هغوی دا هیله نه درلوده چی په دومره شمیر ډیر افغانان په داسی نسبتا سختو شرایطو کی به د رایو ورکولو تلوسه او عزم ولری.  خو افغانانو دا کار وکړ او جمهور ریس کرزی ته یی دا زمینه برابره کړه چی د افغانستان په تاریخ کی لمړنی ولسمشر شی چی واک  بل کاندید ته د رایو د لاری په مصالحت امیزه توګه د قانون په چوکاټ کی انتقال کړی.

خو یوه ستونزه چی ډیرو افغانانو په دی پروسه کی تجربه کړه هغه د کاندیدانو تعدد وو.  نام خدا یولس کاندیدانو دا ادعا کړی وه چی سل زره کارتونه یی د افغانستان د ۲۴ ولایتونو څخه راټول کړی او ددوی پلویان دی.  په دی یولس کاندیدانو کی داسی څهری هم راښکاره شوی چی نه خو یی علمی او نه یی هم ملکی اهلیت درلوده.  د نتایجو د پایلو د اعلان وروسته دا جوته شوه چی یا خو دوی چا تیر وستی وو او یا خو هم دوی د افغانانو د یوه موټی کیدو سره نه علاقه درلوده او نه یی پکی خپلی شخصی ګټی لیدلی.

د نوموړو کاندیدانو یواځینی لاسته راوړنه داوه چی د خلکو رایی  یی تقسیم کړی او پری نښودل چی د مخکښو کاندیدانو څخه یی یو هم د ۵۰ فیصدو څخه د زیاتو رایو اکثریت لاسته راوړی.  خو یوه ګټه یی وکړه او هغه داوه چی پر دی متیقن شول چی په واقعی ډول د خلکو په منځ کی د دوی محبوبیت څو فیصده دی. 

د نوموړو فیصدو په پام کی نیولو سره افغانانو باید یو درس زده کړی وی او هغه دادی چی په راتلونکی کی یواځی څو کاندیدانو ته د نامزدی شرایط برابر کړی او د یوی مړی ډوډی، څادر او یا خولی په بدل کی خپل کارتونه داسی کاندیدانو ته ورنکړی چی په سلو کی یی د ګټلو امکان یو فیصد هم نه وی.  که نه د همدی ځل ټاکنو د تجربی په اساس به په راتلونکی کی هم خپل وجدان ته او هم خپل  خالق ته ملامت وی. 

افغانستان یو غریب ملک دی، هغه دارای چی اوس د ټاکنو په دوهم پړاوو لږول کیږی ، هغه باید د افغانانو د ژوند په ښه کولو لږیدلی وای .  اوس نو قضاوت زمونږ دی چی دغه اخوا دیخوا کاندیدان څومره د افغانانو او یا افغانستان  سوکالی ته مخلص وو؟  

افغانستان بعد از ۲۰۱۴ 

محب ارسلان

امریکا و متحدین آن پلان خروج نیروهای نظامی خود را ازافغانستان اعلام نموده و تعداد زیادی از آنها شروع به خروج نیروها و کارزارهای نظامی خود را کرده اند. برای بدست اوردن این هدف و تطبیق برنامه واگذاری قدرت به  افغانها چندین برنامه ها روی کار هستند.

یک برنامه واگذاری مسولیت امنیتی به نیرو های افغان است.  حالا اردوی افغانستان عملیات نظامی را مستقیما رهبری میکنند و نظامیان خارجی در این زمینه نیروی های افغان را با امکانات مالی، تخنیکی و وسایل همکاری مینمایند.  همچنان پولیس ملی افغان مسلکی شده اند و مسولیت امنیت را در شهرهای افغانستان بدوش دارند.

در پهلوی اخذ مسولیت امنیتی و نظامی، افغانها مسولیت رهبر کردن کارهای انکشافی را نیز بدوش خود گرفته اند.  دولت افغانستان ملکیت برنامه های انکشافی و عامه را میگیرد و سکتور خصوصی خدمات و کار ها را انجام میدهد که کمپنی های خارجی ان را در گذشته انجام مینمودند.  

مقایسه حالات امروزی با حالات سال های ١٩٩٠

بعضی ها شرایط افغانستان را ممثل شرایط میدانند که شوروی ها  از افغانسان بیرون رانده شدند.  آن زمان دولت افغانستان ضعیف بود و با یک شورش قوی ایدولوژیک روبرو بود، بیکاری در بین جوان ها زیاد بود و حالات کلی اقتصادی بد بود.  همچنان روابط افغانستان با کشور های همسایه به خصوص با پاکستان وضیعت بد داشت.  

دولت فعلی افغانستان نیز با چنین چالشها روبرو است، اما شرایط امروزی کشور با شرایط سال های ١٩٩٠ به کلی متفاوت است.

امروز قانون اساسی افغانستان این کشور را یک جمهوری اسلامی خوانده است.  پس هیچ کدام دلیلی برای شورش علنی ایدولوژیک وجود ندارد.  همچنان  دولت فعلی افغانستان در انزوای بین المللی قرار ندارد.  امروز افغانستان با تعداد کثیر از کشورهای غربی و منطقه روابط خوب دارد و با آنها قراردادهای ستراتیژیک را امضا نموده اند.  این قرار دادها تداوم روابط افغانستان را با کشورهای مهم جهان تعریف نموده و تعهد آنها را به افغانستان بعد از سال ٢٠١٤ م  واضح میسازد. علاوه بر این قرارداد های ستراتیژیک، افغانستان در حال گفتگو  در مورد قرارداد امنیتی دو جانبه با ایالات متحده امریکا است.  این قرار داد برای تداوم روابط افغانستان با ایالات متحده امریکا و باقی ماندن یک تعداد محدود نظامیان آنها در افغانستان لازمی است.  لویه جرگه افغانها به ریس جمهور کرزی مشوره داد تا این قرارداد را با در نظرداشت منافع ملی افغانستان امضا نماید.  با وجود چنه زنیهای دوامدار بین کرزی و ایالات متحده امریکا، بعید نیست که این سند به امضا برسد و زمینه بودن نظامیان امریکایی  را در افغانستان بعد از سال ۲۰۱۴م در یک چارچوب دوجانبه قانونی سازد.

تغیریات دیگر نیز امروز مشاهده میشود که در سالهای ١٩٩٠ تصور آن هم نمی شد.  در آن زمان تنها چند پوهنتون های محدود دولتی وجود داشت و آنها هم چندان امکانات را نداشتند.  امروز در پهلوی دانشگاهای دولتی،  به صدها موسستا تعلیمی و تحصیلی خصوصی محصلین افغان را آموزش میدهند.  سیستم خصوصی صحی هیچ موجود نداشت، امروز به صدها شفاخانها و کلینیک های خصوصی در پهلوی شفاخانهای دولتی فعال هستند و خدمات صحی را به افغانها فراهم میسازند.  بعضی از این ادارت خارجی هستند که نمونه آن کلینیک جرمن در شهر نو کابل است که خدمات را به سطح بین المللی به افغانها ارایه مینماید. همچنان انکشافات که در سکتور تعمیر زیربناها، رشد تکنالوژی معلوماتی و مخابراتی، بانکداری، هوانوردی، تجارت و خدمات ترانسپورتی مشاهده میشود، در تاریخ افغانستان بی نظیر میباشند.  

نظر افغانها در مورد تحولات فعلی

افغانهای عادی این تحولات را نادیده نمی گیرند.  آنها میدانند که پیشرفت افغانستان زمینه کار را مساعد ساخته و تاثیر مثبت را بالای زندگی آنها داشته است.  با یک تکسی ران کابل که در مورد تحولات و پیشرفتهای افغانستان صحبت میکردم برایم گفت که اصلاً افغانستان امروز با سال های ١٩٩٠ قابل مقایسته نیست.  امروز یک افغان فرصتهای زیادی را برای کسب تعلیم و تربیه دارد، میتواند به راحت به بسیاری از ولایات کشور و یا هم بیرون از کشور سفر نماید.  در سالهای ١٩٩٠ مردم نمی توانست تا از شرق به غرب کابل بروند.   

با این که انتخابات پیشرو ریاست جمهوری و بعضی از مسایل دیگر افغانها را برای اینده خود و کشور شان نگران میکند ، اما هیچ کدام آنها خواهان حالات سال های ١٩٩٠ و یا برگذشت به آن نیستند.  افغانها میدانند که هم خود شان و هم بعضی از خارجی ها خون و ثروت خود را برای ایجاد حالات امروزی صرف نموده اند و به آن هرج میگذارند.

 افغانها میخواهند که انتخابات ارام را داشته باشند، با دنیا روابط نزدیک داشته باشند، با همسایه گان روابط خوب به اساس احترام متقابل داشته باشند و به صورت کلی حرکت خود را به سوی یک افغانستان مرفع و ارام ادامه دهند.  اما یک موضوع مهم تعریف و تسریع کننده تمام این خواسته  ها بعد از سال ٢٠١٤ م میباشد:  آن موضوع تقویه اتحاد ذات البینی بین تمام اقوام و اقشار افغان است.  

پس بحیث یک افغان (پسر و یا دختر این سرزمین)، باید در محدوده صلاحیت و مسولیت خود برای اتحاد افغانها و تقویه روحیه ملی مسولیت خود را شناساسی و اجرا نمایم.